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The scope of this book is enormously impressive: centred on the 
French Caribbean, it also considers the English- and Spanish-speaking 
Caribbean, pre- and post-revolutionary France, Faulkner and Keri 
Ilulme, while ranging from the famous (Goethe, Conrad) to the ob-
scure (Bissette, Maynard). The main axis is a juxtaposition of the be-
ginning of modern colonialism in the late-eighteenth century with 
decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, to illustrate Bongie's 
concept of the "post/colonial": decolonization is not a clean break 
with the past, and Bongie inserts the slash mark into "postcolonial" to 
indicate an ambiguous separation/complicity of the chronologically 
postcolonial with the colonial period. But the book covers far more 
ground than this, partly because Bongie is unashamedly eclectic and 
digressive. It is, therefore, hard work to read (and the digressions oc-
casionally lead to slippage in the argument). Its "central theoretical 
point of reference" is Edouard Glissants concept of creolization: the 
basis for a postmodern theorization of identity as mixed, fluid, "cha-
otic," non-originary and relational. This creolized identity forms one 
pole of a "creole continuum," whose opposite pole is the essentialist 
conception of identity that Bongie associates with modernism, par-
ticularly with primitivism, racism and belief in a revolutionary future. 
He argues that neither pole can be fully attained, and analyses texts to 
show how they are inevitably drawn back, from one end or the other, 
into the "creole" middle ground; naive essentialism is no longer pos-
sible, but nor is a whole-heartedly postmodern ditching of essentialist 
identitarian discourse. 
This is not to say that both poles have equal status. Bongie's posi-
tion is unambiguously post-modernist and, for all he recognizes the 
necessity of the modernist pole, he is rather patronizing in regard to 
its proponents. And, since postmodernism is positive and modernism 
is negative, the reasons why neither is a tenable stable position are 
very different. Given the centrality of the concept of the continuum, 
an explicit discussion of these differences would have been useful. 
Thus, it appears that what destabilizes the modernist, essentialist pole 
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is a kind of realism — the "perplexity of the living," in a phrase of 
Homi Bhabha's that Bongie quotes several times — as it exposes the 
inadequacies of essentialist assumptions; for instance, Bernardin de 
Saint-Pierre's "creole openness" (gg) and "acute sensitivity to the his-
torical changes wrought by revolution" (84) mean that "the abstract 
philosophical vision that characterized Enlightenment thinking 
about the exotic begins to give way to an historical insight, traceable 
in great part to Bernardin 's own lived encounter with the colonies, that de-
stabilizes such generalizations without fully abolishing them" (85, my 
italics). Similar arguments are made concerning Louis Maynard (303, 
309) and Hugo (260). These writers are thus forced some way to-
wards recognizing the heterogeneity, historicity and constructedness 
of identity — because this is how it really is. 
Obviously the same argument cannot apply to the other end of the 
continuum, to define the force that pulls postmodernists back from a 
complete realization of their creolizing projects. What, exactly, is the 
"necessity" of reinscribing, ambivalently and relatively, fixed identi-
ties? Bongie usually explains this necessity in deconstructivist terms, as 
the general impossibility of breaking free of one way of thinking and 
moving on to a completely different one; contradictory traces of an 
old ideology will always remain in the new one, and so a lingering 
modernism is inevitable. This generalized discursive inertia is fre-
quently invoked: a concept "will always fall short of what it points to-
ward" (10); "we cannot simply do away with . . . exclusionary thinking" 
(11); "we incessantly fall back upon the 'tragic' structures and con-
structs that we are attempting to disarticulate" (50). 
At other points in the book, however, he rather tentatively puts for-
ward a different, political argument for the necessary (as distinct from 
inevitable) survival of essentialist identities: a strategic, intentional, 
qualified use of collective identity to facilitate political struggle. Thus, 
"provisional affirmations of identity are often politically necessary, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are theoretically 'unviable' (to echo 
Gayatri Spivak)" ( 11 ); Kwame Appiah is cited approvingly for "[telling 
us] not simply to go 'beyond identity,' but to recuperate its language 
carefully, 'strategically,' in light of the fact that 'the label works despite 
the absence of an essence'" (51 ), and Paul Gilroy's "anti-anti-essential-
ism" (ibid) is similarly commended. But this second, political argu-
ment for the necessity of identity is curiously inconclusive. Returning 
to it in his final chapter, he admits that he feels uncomfortable with it 
(414-5), and would like to ask such "heretical" questions as: "why are 
communities 'obliged' to survive . . . why do ethnic groups 'need' to 
be different?" 
This is very revealing, because it implies that Bongie does not con-
ceive of political conflict as being about anything except identity: all 
politics is identity politics. One rather obvious answer to his heretical 
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questions would be: in order to mobilize people for a campaign to 
improve their living conditions (cf Glissant's remark, dismissively and 
uncomprehendingly quoted on Bongie's last page, that "blacks in the 
United States naturally need Afrocentrism in order to struggle against 
their condition" 434)- Bongie cannot see that identity might be a 
means to a different end, because for him it is the only issue at stake, 
and so he cannot carry the argument to its conclusion. 
This inability to see beyond identity politics has implications for his 
critique of modernism, and ultimately for his discussion of identity 
itself. Thus decolonization, which he sees as a major manifestation of 
modernism's belief in revolution, operated with an essentialist con-
ception of identity: the pure, originary difference of the colonized 
from the colonizers. But colonialism, too, legimitized itself through 
essentialist assumptions about identity (civilized/savage, etc.). On the 
basis of these two perfectly accurate observations, Bongie concludes 
that there is no difference at all between "the colonial project and its 
anti-colonial double" (13). This would only be true if decolonization 
were solely or primarily about identity. In reality, the main objectives 
for the vast majority of the colonized were economic; as Fanon — 
whose account of decolonization Bongie uses heavily — writes, it is "a 
battle against exploitation, misery, and hunger" (224). Only by ex-
cluding socio-economic factors can Bongie see colonialism and 
decolonization as identical. The exclusion of socio-economic factors 
also prevents him from conceiving of different social groups with con-
flicting economic interests. Conflict and struggle are merely "ideo-
logical," and therefore groundless in the face of "our awareness of the 
fact that we areali living in the same creolized and creolizing 'commu-
nity-world'" (43). This in turn impacts on his theorization of identity, 
in which there are only two possibilities: essentialist or creolized (or a 
mixture of both). He cannot engage with a third, influential 
postcolonial conception of identity as socially constructed, e.g., 
Spivak's notion of the subaltern excluded from hegemonic discourse 
by his or her socio-economic position. 
Reducing decolonization to a purely ideological battle over identity 
makes it equally difficult for him to see how Glissant can both pro-
mote creolized identity and remain committed to anti-colonial resis-
tance. For Bongie this is a contradiction, and as such evidence of the 
inevitable, unwilled, persistence of modernist elements in 
postmodern thinking: Glissant's "vision of creolization" is "inextrica-
bly tangled up with other ideological commitments" (137). He alter-
nately tries to play down Glissant's commitment to anti-colonial 
resistance, and to present it as valuable evidence of the inescapably 
ambivalent "creole middle ground" that he posits; both attitudes lead 
him into what I would argue are misreadings of Glissant's texts. In the 
first case, for instance, while on the one hand demonstrating that 
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Le discours antillais is (regrettably) full of decolonizing fervour, Bongie 
also claims that the pessimistic tone of the roughly contemporaneous 
Malemort is due as much to Glissant's disillusionment with 
decolonization as to his "local anguish" at the situation in Martinique 
(149-50), and even that the "unviability" of "the newly decolonized 
nation states" is more apparent in Martinique because it has not been 
decolonized (155). Elsewhere Bongie translates a sentence from 
Poétique de la relation: "if the imagination of totality helps no one orga-
nize resistance, one can at least believe that it might enable all of us to 
protect ourselves from so many of the mistakes [errements] that re-
sulted from the old ideological ways of thinking" (142). Bongie treats 
this as a "double-edged claim" which asserts simultaneously that al-
though the necessity of organizing resistance shows up the limitations 
of the creolizing imagination of totality, conversely, organizing resis-
tance will inevitably fall prey to ideological "mistakes" because it is not 
protected by the imagination of totality: "The above sentence thus 
situates us between an open totality that, in its complexity, cannot be 
read in any univocal way and the simple act of structuring resistance 
that still depends upon the very errements away from which Glissant is 
apparently directing us" (142). But Glissant is not equating "organiz-
ing resistance" per se with "the old ideological ways of thinking," and 
hence "mistakes." The sentence preceding the one Bongie quotes 
(page 2 17 of Poétique) says that power now operates on a global level 
and so it is futile to try to resist it solely on a local level; later on the 
same page Glissant adds that the "imagination of totality" cannot pro-
vide specific guidelines for particular conflicts, but conversely "no so-
lution put into practice can afford to ignore or underestimate the 
movement of this totality." 
I have concentrated on Bongie's presentation of Glissant because it 
is especially on the subject of decolonization that I find him uncon-
vincing. His accounts of late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century 
texts, and of Daniel Maximin, whom he sees as an exemplary 
postmodern writer, are cogent and illuminating, despite the careless 
argumentation that crops up occasionally throughout the book, and 
that is an understandable consequence of the sheer number of novel-
ists, critics and theorists with which Bongie is so ambitiouslyjuggling. 
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